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ACTA AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Peter Maybarduk1
ABSTRACT
Although the term ―anti-counterfeiting‖ suggests an agreement limited to
preventing trade in counterfeit products, ACTA’s draft provisions, to date,2
would set new minimum enforcement standards for a range of intellectual
property rights. In several areas, these standards could impede legitimate
competition, shortchange legal process and shift costs of enforcing private
commercial rights to the public.
The parties to ACTA have agreed to narrow some of its provisions in
recent months. Despite these improvements to its text, ACTA continues to
present risks for global access to medicines, including potentially restricting
free transit of generics, imposing chilling effects on the medicines trade, and
limiting flexibilities in intellectual property (IP) rules.
The parties have cited protecting consumers from unsafe products as a
primary benefit of ACTA. But among IP infringements, only willful
trademark counterfeiting of potentially dangerous classes of products poses a
categorical public safety risk. Outside the context of counterfeiting, IP
infringement analysis is not related to health. Moreover, ACTA diverts
attention and resources away from more direct and comprehensive public
safety measures.
ACTA’s most significant public health costs may come from its narrative
positioning and precedent. ACTA does not adequately distinguish between
criminal activity and civil infringements occurring in the context of market
competition—a problem that concerns consumer groups and intellectual
property owners alike.
Several parties to ACTA now rightly suggest narrowing the agreement’s
scope altogether. Public health analysis leads to the conclusion that ACTA
should be scaled back to cover only willful commercial scale trademark
counterfeiting.

1

Access to Medicines Program Director, Public Citizen.
This paper refers to the August 25, 2010 draft unless otherwise noted. AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft: Aug. 25, 2010,
PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow
―Full Leaked Text Dated August 25, 2010‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Aug. 25,
2010].
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OVERVIEW: ACTA & PUBLIC HEALTH

Although the term ―anti-counterfeiting‖ suggests an agreement limited to
preventing trade in counterfeit products, ACTA’s draft provisions, to date,
would set new minimum enforcement standards for a range of intellectual
property rights. In several areas, these standards could impede legitimate
competition, shortchange legal process, and shift costs of enforcing private
commercial rights to the public. ACTA’s draft text blurs key distinctions
between market competition and criminal activity and takes a step toward
creating de facto international intellectual property regimes. Under its
broader proposed terms, ACTA, not unlike a counterfeit, misrepresents its
true ingredients to the public.
Some of ACTA’s draft provisions continue to present risks for global
access to medicines. These include potentially restricting the free transit of
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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lifesaving and cost-lowering generic medicines. ACTA could impose
potentially chilling effects on the medicines trade and limit the use of key
flexibilities in intellectual property rules. ACTA could make it easier for
major pharmaceutical companies to seek to limit or deter generic market entry
worldwide by projecting national intellectual property regimes into the
customs regulation of global trade. Even given recent improvements to its
text, ACTA could still establish the scope of the European Union’s
controversial customs regulation 1383/20033—which has led to customs
actions stopping lifesaving medicines in transit to developing countries—as a
default international norm.
Expanding an anti-counterfeiting agreement beyond counterfeits does not
similarly expand its benefits to consumers. Willful, commercial scale
trademark counterfeiting is a criminal offense under the World Trade
Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS)4 and appropriately targeted by law enforcement. But civil IP
infringements—including among others patent and ―similar‖ trademarks or
trade dress—are not criminal acts, and do not generally represent a fraud on
the public. Civil infringements are typically commercial disputes between
legitimate entities, for which traditional legal remedies are and should be
available. Civil infringements do not require preemptive law enforcement
interdiction, be it ex officio or on a rights holder application, wherever they
appear in the channels of commerce. Instead, assessing infringement requires
judicial process, and often expert legal analysis, that is outside the
competence of customs and other law enforcement authorities.
ACTA’s draft text does not adequately distinguish between criminal
activity and civil infringement. The Intellectual Property Owners Association
and other industry groups share this concern.5 Major businesses commonly
find themselves on either side of infringement disputes. ACTA’s draft terms
would impose legal uncertainty and costs, while tainting commercial disputes
with the air of criminality. Indeed, it is difficult to identify compelling public
rationales for many of ACTA’s provisions, or the proposed ongoing work of
3

Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7 [hereinafter Council Reg.
1383/2003].
4
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 61, 108
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
5
Intellectual Property Owners Association letter to USTR (June 25, 2010) available at
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.c
fm&CONTENTID=26347. See also ―ECIS' concerns on the impact of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA"),‖ European Committee for Interoperable
Systems,’ Sept. 17, 2010, available at:
http://www.ecis.eu/documents/ECISACTApositionpaper.pdf.
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an ACTA Committee, when applied to civil infringements.
The parties to ACTA have cited protecting consumers from unsafe
products as a primary benefit of the agreement. But among intellectual
property infringements, only willful trademark counterfeiting of certain
potentially dangerous classes of products poses a categorical public safety
risk. Willful counterfeit medicines, by definition and by din of being illegal,
are not registered with drug regulatory authorities and hence not regulated—
and therefore cannot be considered safe for consumption.
By contrast, civil infringements do not pose an inherent safety risk.
Outside the context of counterfeiting, IP infringement analysis is not
reasonably related to health, and does not contribute to public safety. Instead,
expanding ACTA’s scope to cover civil infringements targets market
competition preemptively, including registered generic medicines, without
benefits to public safety, and to the detriment of public health interests
including access to medicines. Moreover, ACTA diverts resources and
attention away from more direct and comprehensive measures to protect the
public from unsafe products.
This white paper reviews some of the proposed ACTA terms that create
risks for access to medicines, and offers suggestions for improvement. The
paper then clarifies the relationship between classes of infringement and
health and safety, and reviews the harmful precedent ACTA could set by
treating alleged civil infringements and market activity under the narrative of
counterfeiting. This public health analysis leads to the conclusion that ACTA
should be scaled back to cover only criminal, willful, commercial scale
trademark counterfeiting.
II.

ACCESS TO MEDICINES: ACTA'S CONTINUING RISKS

Market competition plays a key role in improving global access to
medicines by reducing costs over time to levels where governments and
donors can scale-up treatment coverage. For example, over the last ten years,
global competition and generic medicines have produced a revolution in
HIV/AIDS treatment, reducing prices from $10,000 to $100 per person per
year in developing countries, and enabling more than five million people
worldwide to access lifesaving antiretroviral therapy. Competition remains
every bit as vital today to expand access to new drugs, including among many
others expensive second and third-line HIV/AIDS treatments.
A. Impeding the Transit of Generics
ACTA’s text no longer requires countries to provide special preemptive
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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border measures for patents. Nevertheless, the Border Measures section may
still prejudice the interests of competition and access. To improve the scope
of ACTA’s Border Measures section, the parties should reject the
EU/Switzerland proposal, and adopt in its place a sole, modified
US/Sing/Aus/NZ/J/Can provision: ―Parties shall provide for the provisions
related to border measures to be applied in cases of [willful] trade mark
counterfeiting and copyright piracy [on a commercial scale].‖6
ACTA’s proposed Border Measures have raised concerns from the first
leaked draft. Under some early proposals, ACTA would have required
countries to empower customs agents to seize medicines on mere suspicion or
rights holder allegation of patent infringement, ahead of judicial process, even
if the medicines were simply in transit through the port. This mirrors what has
happened under European Council Regulation 1383/2003.7 Many times,
customs agents detained or seized shipments of generic medicines from India
en route to other developing countries.8 While not all case details are
available, it is clear that in some instances the medicines were not even under
patent in India or the destination country. India and Brazil have since initiated
procedures at the WTO to review the TRIPS compliance of Council
Regulation 1383/2003, and some legal scholars argue the regulation may
violate principles of territoriality and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.9
Enforcement measures that rights holders can trigger automatically and ex
parte are prone to abuse. Measures that customs authorities take on their own
initiative, ex officio, are prone to inaccuracy and over enforcement. Generics
firms are often smaller than patent-based pharmaceutical firms, and operate
on lower margins of return. Special border measures could jeopardize not
only particular shipments of generic medicines, but the business model for the
relatively small-scale generics industry, and the access to medicines interests
that rely on it. In response to the medicines detentions, several Indian
generics producers are reported to have altered economical transshipment
through Europe in favor of alternative and more costly routes. Diversion of
such medicines from Europe could also risk the storage and distribution
6

ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Sec. 2, Art. 2.X: Scope of the Border
Measures.
7
Council Reg. 1383/2003, supra note 3.
8
Press Release, Health Action International, Another seizure of generic medicines
destined for a developing country, this time in Frankfurt (June 5, 2009), available at
http://www.haiweb.org/19062009/5%20Jun%202009%20Press%20release%20Seizure%20of
%20generic%20medicines%20in%20Frankfurt.pdf.
9
For a discussion of territoriality, GATT Article V, TRIPS and implications for border
measures applied to in transit goods, see XAVIER SEUBA, FREE TRADE OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PRODUCTS: THE LIMITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AT THE BORDER 16
(ICTSD, ed. 2010).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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practices of health-related NGOs that use warehouses in Europe as way
stations for products eventually distributed to developing countries in Africa
and Latin America.
But the most unfortunate consequence of such border measures could be
wrongly tethering the public image of generic drugs to that of counterfeits
requiring concerted police action. This danger is not speculative. Medical
professionals worldwide struggle against stigma and propaganda that
insinuates generics represent second-class treatment. Recent East African
anti-counterfeiting bills effectively criminalize the generics trade, by
extending criminal penalties to infringements of any intellectual property right
held anywhere in the world. ACTA, as a flagship IP enforcement proposal,
must actively discourage, rather than encourage, the trend to treat generics
and civil infringement claims with policing measures designed for
counterfeits.
1. Improvements and Outstanding Concerns
Access to medicines concerns and controversy seem to have persuaded the
ACTA parties to revise the agreement’s text. ACTA no longer requires
countries to apply extraordinary border measures to patents. This is a clear
and important improvement, and some negotiators and trade officials now
maintain that this resolves any access concerns in the agreement. However,
there are at least two outstanding concerns in ACTA’s border measures.
a. The EU’s Proposed Default Rule
First, the EU/Switzerland proposal still assumes a default position that
ACTA’s border measures will apply to all classes of intellectual property,
including patents. Countries may exclude patents if they choose: ―[EU/CH]:
For the purposes of this section, ‗goods infringing an intellectual property
right‘ means goods infringing any of the intellectual property rights covered
by TRIPS.* However, Parties may decide to exclude from the scope of this
section, certain rights other than trademarks, copyrights and GIs…‖10
A default rule such as this, even if not a requirement, still establishes a
norm. If the parties adopt the EU/CH proposal, then ACTA would promote a
presumption in favor of applying special border measures to patents wherever
the agreement’s considerable influence may extend.
Emerging global IP enforcement trends make this concern all the more

10

ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Ch. 2, Sec. 2, provisions on Scope. [*
The provisions of this section shall also apply to confusingly similar trademark goods.].
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

7

PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-09

salient. EC Council Regulation 1383/2003 still applies to patents (although it
is under review). The EU is exporting similar standards through economic
partnership agreements. East African nations are debating new laws,
regulations and proposed laws that impose much broader and harsher boarder
measures. An ACTA assumption that preemptive border measures—ex ante,
ex parte, ex officio—should commonly apply to patents, even with safeguards
in place, still lends legitimacy and momentum to a flawed idea. Adopting the
recommended and modified US/Sing/Aus/NZ/J/Can provision, above, would
correct this particular problem.
b. Civil Trademark Claims
Second, and also under the EU/Switzerland proposal, ACTA would still
require countries to apply special border measures to geographic indicators
and to all classes of trademark and copyright infringement—not only willful
counterfeiting and piracy. The inclusion of civil trademark claims in ACTA’s
border measures creates risks for access to medicines similar to those raised
by patents.
In intellectual property usage, the term ―counterfeit‖ applies correctly to a
subset of trademark infringement.
Under the TRIPS Agreement,11
―counterfeit trademark goods shall mean any goods, including packaging,
bearing without authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark
validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished
in its essential aspects from such a trademark[.]‖ This definition is
incorporated into the latest ACTA text under General Definitions (previously
at footnote 23).
A trademark counterfeit is distinct from a case in which the commercial
design or packaging of one firm’s registered medicine is alleged to create a
―likelihood of confusion‖12 with another firm’s established trademark. For
example, pharmaceutical firms sometimes give their products commercial
names derived in part from an active ingredient’s international nonproprietary
name (INN).13 Branded and generic products based on the same active
ingredient may therefore bear similar names. Generic medicines also
sometimes feature packaging or pill design with similar qualities to

11

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 51 n. 14.
See, e.g., id. art. 16.1; Council Directive 89/104/EEC Art. 5.1(b), 1989 O.J. (L 40)
replaced by Council Directive 2008/95/EC Art. 5, 2008 O.J. (L 299/25) ; and Trade Marks
Act of 1994, 1994, c. 26, § 10.2 (U.K.). For US and EU case articulations of the ―likelihood
of confusion‖ standard, see infra note 15.
13
See, e.g., Chan S. Park, Legal Aspects of Defining ―Counterfeit Medicines‖: A
Discussion Paper, (World Health Org. Regional Office for South-East Asia, 2009).
12
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established marks, specifically because the products are therapeutically
equivalent, and designed for consumers’ interchangeable use.
Many
pharmacies place generics on their shelves next to brand-name products, often
featuring somewhat similar coloring or designs.14 Similar packaging is used
to communicate a similar (bioequivalent) product. Policy goals favoring
generic substitution support this general practice.
Similar marketing names or similar packaging for drugs sometimes do
form the basis of civil trademark infringement claims. Trademark owners
have a legitimate commercial interest in defending their marks. Judicial
recourse is, and should be, available in such circumstances. But in neither
case has the generics manufacturer fraudulently misrepresented the source or
identity of its product.
And neither would be properly termed
―counterfeiting.‖
ACTA should reflect this distinction. Civil trademark claims typically
require a weighing of many factors.15 Assessing infringement requires legal
process and analysis outside the competence of customs authorities. Notably,
courts have tended to grant narrower trademark and trade dress protection to
pharmaceuticals than to other classes of products.16 This is due to the
functionality of pill design, as well as the consumer interests served by
communicating bioequivalence. The risk is high that customs agents,
encouraged to stop as much infringing activity as possible, would sometimes
apply trademark infringement standards too zealously. At least one recent EU
customs detention of generic medicines in transit cited—wrongly, it turned
14

See e.g., Sean Flynn & Amy Kapczynski, Counterfeit Versus "Confusingly Similar"
Products, PIJIP BLOG (May 7, 2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/pijip05072010.
15
In the United States, federal courts tend to apply multifactor tests, such as these from
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to measure ―likelihood of confusion‖: strength of the
mark, proximity of the goods, similarity of the marks, evidence of actual confusion,
marketing channels used, type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser, defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, and likelihood of expansion of the product
lines. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979). The court noted, ―the
list is not exhaustive. Other variables may come into play depending on the particular facts
presented.‖ Id. at 348 n. 11. See also Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492
(2d Cir.1961).
In regard to European standards for analyzing a community trademark under First
Council Directive, 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L40) 1, art. 5.1(b), courts use a "global
assessment test" which requires all circumstances of and surrounding the good be taken into
account. Factors include assumption of an "ordinary consumer" viewpoint, overall impression
of the mark, level of distinctiveness, weight of similarity of the goods against similarity of the
marks, risk of public confusion as to economic source of the goods. See Case C–251/95,
Sabel v. Puma, 1997 E.C.R. I-6191; Case C–39/1997, Canon v. MGM, 1998 E.C.R. I-5507;
Case C–342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV, 1999 E.C.R.
I-3819; Case C–425/98, Marca Mode CV v. Adidas AG, 2000 E.C.R. I-4861.
16
See Public Citizen Research Note, ―Trademark and Trade Dress Infringement
Standards for Generic Pharmaceuticals,‖ Arielle Singh, July 31, 2010 [on file with author];
see also, e.g., Shire U.S., Inc., v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 344-35 (3d Cir. 2003).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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out—trademark infringement grounds.17 And the potential for spurious
claims and rights holder abuse applies to civil trademark infringement much
as it does to patents.
A better standard would target willful counterfeits specifically and
exclusively. There may be reason to distinguish between cases of willful
trademark counterfeiting and cases of arguable counterfeiting where no intent
to fraudulently misrepresent source is evident. Note the TRIPS definition of
counterfeiting does not require a showing of intent. The ―substantially
indistinguishable mark‖ counterfeiting standard could also be different in
some limited cases than a standard of fraudulent misrepresentation of source.
Perhaps one firm could use a packaging design nearly identical to an
established design, but employ a different name. This could amount to
―substantially indistinguishable‖ use of a mark or trade dress classifying the
product, in some analysis, as counterfeit, but it might still represent more an
effort to indicate similarity (or bioequivalence) to the first product than an
effort to claim the product is actually produced by the other company.
Notably, TRIPS creates an enforcement distinction between counterfeiting
in general and cases of ―willful trademark counterfeiting on a commercial
scale,‖ the latter being subject to criminal penalties (Article 61). This is the
appropriate standard for special border measures intended to target activity
that cannot be adequately addressed by civil judicial process. While the intent
of the alleged infringer may not always be evident, this is initially true of
many law enforcement targets. It remains important to apply the legal
standard most rationally related to the policy goal of stopping criminal
counterfeiting, and to maintain a clear and consistent distinction between
alleged civil infringement and criminal activity in enforcement procedures.
17

According to Health Action International:
A shipment of the antibiotic, Amoxicillin, manufactured in India and
destined for the Republic of Vanuatu in the Pacific, was seized by customs
officials on 5 May, 2009, while in transit through Frankfurt, Germany.
Amoxicillin is an essential medicine used to treat a wide range of bacterial
infections. In this latest case, customs authorities seized a shipment of 3,047,000
pills of Amoxicillin (250 mg), worth approximately 28,000 Euros for four weeks
before releasing it to Vanuatu. The batch was detained on grounds of suspected
trademark infringement. This quantity of tablets is equivalent to 76,000 courses
of treatment. Customs authorities then informed GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), which
received the letter on 13 May. Seven days later, GSK informed the German
customs authorities that there was no trademark infringement. GSK is the former
patent holder for ―Amoxil‖, a brand name amoxicillin. There is no valid reason
for detaining these medicines especially since the name ―Amoxicillin‖ is an
international nonproprietary name (INN).
Press Release, Health Action International, Another seizure of generic medicines destined for
a developing country, this time in Frankfurt (June 5, 2009), available at
http://www.haiweb.org/19062009/5%20Jun%202009%20Press%20release%20Seizure%20of
%20generic%20medicines%20in%20Frankfurt.pdf.
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B. Imposing Chilling Effects on the Medicines Trade
ACTA’s proposed norms on liability still leave too much uncertain. A
particular area of concern, requiring greater attention and scrutiny from the
Parties, is intermediary liability. An EU/Switzerland proposal would provide
for general availability of injunctive relief against ―intermediaries whose
services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right.‖18
In the context of pharmaceuticals, such injunctions might include, for
example, orders to cease sales to a generics firm. Intermediaries might
include shippers and the manufacturers of active pharmaceutical ingredients,
and potentially reach or influence the medicines procurement decisions of
agencies such as the Global Fund. The uncertain reach of injunctions could
contribute to a chilling market for medicines. A new note available from law
professor Brook Baker describes in further detail the potentially disruptive
effect of a broad ACTA intermediary liability provision on the global
medicines trade.19
ACTA's Article 2.4, ―Information Related to Infringement,‖ would require
countries to make available, upon justified request of the right holder, court
orders requiring alleged infringers to identify distributors and other business
partners or contractors throughout the production chain. This provision opens
up possibilities for rights holders to harass contractors that work with their
competition. The provision becomes more concerning when taken in concert
with recent proposed U.S. legislation to establish lists of importers that ―have
a history of attempting to import goods that infringe intellectual property
rights‖20 and of ―low-risk importers.‖21 If these and similar proposals are
applied broadly to civil infringements, as is currently proposed, contractors in
the medicines supply chain could reason that working with generics firms
attracts unwanted negative attention, and that their business interests might be
better served working with rights holders.
More generally, if ACTA’s scope remains broad, low-capitalized generics
firms (as well as major transnational companies which also defend against
infringement claims) will have to account for uncertainty and new potential

18

ACTA Section 1: Civil Enforcement, Article 2.X Injunctions 2, ACTA Draft – Aug.
25, 2010, supra note 2.
19
Brook K. Baker, ACTA – Risks of Intermediary Liability in Access to Medicines, (PIJIP
Research Paper No. 1, American Univ. Washington College of Law, Sept. 2010), available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=research.
20
Customs Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Reauthorization Act of 2009, S. 1631,
111th Cong. § 234 (2009).
21
Trade Enforcement Act of 2009, S. 1466, 111th Cong. § 225 (2009).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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costs, including shipping delays, storage and perhaps destruction fees, 22 and
litigation.
C. Limiting Flexibilities in Intellectual Property Rules
Knowledge Ecology International has written extensively on ACTA’s
evolving, but as yet inadequate, allowance for flexibility on damages rules
and the availability of injunctions.23 Under TRIPS Article 44.2, countries are
not required to make injunctive relief available in all circumstances, because
other important national interests, such as reducing medicine costs through the
government use of patents or keeping health products on the market, could be
compromised.24 Similarly, rigid damages and injunctions rules can limit
innovation, by uniformly seeking to prevent or punish infringement, rather
than providing adequate compensation in those particular cases where use of a
proprietary invention might advance technological development.
KEI has pointed out that ACTA’s provisions on damages and injunctions
may conflict with numerous national laws affecting many economic sectors.
Here, again, limiting ACTA’s scope would reduce the number of potential
conflicts.
A separate helpful step would be to adopt the
Canada/Australia/Singapore proposal expressly subjecting ACTA’s civil
enforcement injunction provisions ―to any statutory limitations under its
domestic law.‖25
III.

PUBLIC SAFETY

Parties to ACTA have frequently cited the agreement as a means to
protect the public from unsafe counterfeit products. But most classes of
intellectual property infringements do not raise health and safety concerns by
their nature. Criminal trademark counterfeiting can be an exception, and can
be appropriately targeted ex officio by law enforcement under the TRIPS
Agreement.
However, criminal trademark counterfeiting should be
distinguished not only from patents and other classes of intellectual property,
but also from civil trademark infringement involving similar marks, product
names and trade dress. If ACTA’s scope remains broad, its public health
costs are likely to outweigh its benefits.

22

See ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Art. 2.12.
See James Love, Comments on ACTA Provisions on Damages and Injunctions,
Knowledge Ecology International, April 6, 2010, available at:
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/kei_rn_2010_1.pdf.
24
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Art. 44.2.
25
See ACTA Draft – August 25, 2010, supra note 2, Sec. 1, Art. 2.X: Injunctions.
23
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A. Patents and Supplementary Protection Certificates
Patent infringement analysis is not related to counterfeiting, fraudulent
misrepresentation of source, health or safety. Patent infringement pertains to
alleged use of claimed proprietary inventions, not to fake marks, deliberate
mislabeling or absent required assessments of safety. Indeed, patent
infringement cases allege putting the patented technology to use. In almost all
cases, the alleged infringer is attempting to manufacture or market a
legitimate medicine. Patent infringement actions are civil and commercial
disputes. Rather than protecting public health, imprecise or overly broad
patent enforcement measures could obstruct competition and potentially risk
access to medicines.
Supplementary protection certificates are patent extensions for medicines,
and hence the same analysis applies.
B. Copyright
Copyright analysis is not reasonably related to health or safety. More
particularly, copyright analysis should not be used to challenge the content of
product textual labeling, which is often required by drug regulatory
authorities.
C. Geographical Indications
The use, or misuse, of a place name does not reveal the safety of the
product. Even if a company appropriates the name of a region to indicate
characteristics of a product or a production method, rather than its place of
production, this does not suggest the product is unsafe.26
D. Trademarks—Willful counterfeiting vs. civil, similar infringement
Even in the trademark context, civil infringements (e.g., ―similar‖ marks
and dress) do not pose a general risk to public health. Among IP
infringements, only willful trademark counterfeiting of potentially dangerous
classes of products can be said to pose such an inherent risk.

26

Arguments to the contrary would require that a product’s safety depend on a particular
place of origin or production. It is hard to think of such an example to which Geographical
Indications could apply. Arguments that a place name confuses consumers or that a particular
product’s characteristics or quality depends on the place of production are distinct from
arguments that its safety is so dependent.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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In order to be a willful trademark counterfeit, a product must fraudulently
misrepresent its source by counterfeiting a protected mark. Such a product
could not be approved by a drug regulatory authority. The imitated medicine
may be approved, but the counterfeit is not.27 In other words, willful
trademark counterfeit medicines, by definition and by din of being illegal, are
not registered with drug regulatory authorities, and hence not regulated—and
therefore cannot be considered safe for consumption. In medicines, the
TRIPS standard for criminal trademark infringement—willful trademark
counterfeiting on a commercial scale—is a category that rightly triggers
public health concern. It is appropriate that law enforcement, including
customs authorities, intervene in such circumstances.
But medicines (or other goods) that correctly describe their source and
ingredients, yet bear a similar marketing name, symbol or pill design that
could infringe a protected trademark or trade dress, cannot be said to pose
such a risk. Law enforcement actions that detain or impose extrajudicial costs
on companies for their use of similar marks do not protect the public from
unsafe medicines or target criminal enterprises. Rather, these actions
potentially hinder competition and the interests of global access to
medicines.28
Public safety arguments do not support expanding ACTA’s scope beyond
willful trademark counterfeiting.
E. ACTA‘s Opportunity Cost for Direct Public Safety Measures
Criminal, willful trademark counterfeit medicines are unsafe. But some
falsified and unsafe medicines do not misappropriate qualifying trademarks,
and hence fall beyond trademark law’s reach. These include some falsified
and fraudulently mislabeled medicines termed ―counterfeits‖ by the World
Health Organization and other health agencies. Trademark and intellectual
property are ultimately indirect and under inclusive frameworks for
combating these falsified medicines. Trademark and IP are also inadequate to
address the more common problems of quality shortfalls, inefficacy and
pharmaceutical fraud.
Indeed some and perhaps many of the examples of other unsafe products
mentioned as motives for ACTA and other IP enforcement measures are
unlikely to be counterfeits in the trademark sense.
Rather than
misappropriating a protected mark, these fakes are likely to be counterfeits
27

If in some unlikely scenario, the counterfeit’s producer sought marketing approval for
the counterfeit, the application itself would necessarily be fraudulent.
28
See also CAMPAIGN FOR ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, PATIENTS FIRST: ACCESS
TO SAFE, QUALITY, AND EFFECTIVE DRUGS, (Medecins Sans Frontières, ed. Apr. 2010).
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within the meaning of the laws or regulatory frameworks typically governing
their product class—for example, unapproved electrical components, aircraft
parts, and medicines. Intellectual property is not the most effective
framework for addressing most of these safety concerns. Instead, their
respective regulatory frameworks are. Trademark law may not reach many of
them.
Drug regulatory authority typically provides a more complete framework
for addressing falsified medicines. Selling a falsified or adulterated medicine
is typically a criminal offense, whether it infringes a trademark or not. A
pharmaceutical product that fraudulently misrepresents its source or
ingredients is, inherently and necessarily, not registered or approved for sale,
and can be removed from the channels of commerce in accordance with drug
regulatory authority. In this sense, inspection for fake packaging is even more
a traditional consumer protection and drug regulatory test than it is a
trademark law test. Drug regulatory authority can be, and often is, coupled
appropriately with law enforcement to target falsified medicines, criminal
activity and threats to public safety directly, rather than through a filtering
prism of commercial IP rights.
New attention to extraordinary intellectual property enforcement measures
may come at an opportunity cost for attention to more direct and effective
consumer protection and drug regulatory frameworks. Officially, ―nothing in
[ACTA] creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as
between enforcement of intellectual property rights and enforcement of law in
general.‖29 Nevertheless, ACTA’s chapters on International Cooperation,
Enforcement Practices, and Institutional Arrangements contemplate the
establishment of an ACTA Committee,30 observatories, and consistent
international law enforcement cooperation and technical assistance on
intellectual property, which will necessarily entail new investments and the
allocation of scarce law enforcement resources.
Moreover, because ACTA and other TRIPS-plus enforcement measures
are often advanced as means to combat unsafe products and protect
consumers, they divert resources, public attention and political capital that
otherwise could be harnessed to improve more direct and comprehensive
regulatory and law enforcement measures.
There may also be reason to examine whether rights holders or other
commercial interests, seeking to protect consumer confidence in sometimescounterfeited brands, could use ACTA to argue against requirements to
disclose what they know about fakes in the market. Private companies often

29
30

ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Ch. One, Art. 1.2.2.
Id. at Ch. Five, Art. 5.2.
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have the first or most complete accounts of falsified products but do not
always share what they know.31 To assist in the detection of falsified
medicines, countries could require companies to disclose information they
have about potentially dangerous fakes in the channels of commerce, and
share the information with global law enforcement partners.32 The Joint
Strategic Plan recently announced by the U.S. Intellectual Property
Enforcement Coordinator incorporates one such proposal.33 But ACTA
includes assurances that, ―Nothing [in the referenced sections] shall require
any Party to disclose information which . . . would prejudice the legitimate
commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.‖34 ACTA’s
frequent deference to confidential information could be read to limit the
disclosure and international sharing of information that could help protect
consumers.
IV.

DISTINGUISHING COMPETITION AND CRIMINALITY

31

For example, the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI), formed by fourteen
pharmaceutical companies in 2002, recorded seventy-six cases of ―counterfeiting‖ in 2004.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration only knew of fifty-eight. BUKO PHARMAKAMPAGNE, COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES – WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS? 5 (2007) available at
http://www.bukopharma.de/Service/Archiv/E2007_01_special.pdf [hereinafter BUKO].
Some consider PSI’s counterfeiting database the world’s best, yet it ―is not accessible to the
WHO, health authorities or the public.‖ Robert Cockburn et al., The global threat of
counterfeit drugs: why industry and governments must communicate the dangers, 2 Pub. Libr.
Sci. Med. 302, 305 (2005) [hereinafter PLoS].
In some cases, companies have been accused of being slow to report such knowledge, for
fear of reducing public confidence in their brands—endangering public health in the process.
For example, in 1995, GSK allegedly asked the Ghanaian government not to alert the public
of the presence of fake halofantrine antimalarial syrup in the market, allegedly for the sake of
the company’s reputation. See BUKO, PLoS. GSK also was reluctant to share information
about fake syrup with the authors of the PLoS article. PLoS at 305. In 1998, the Brazilian
government accused Schering do Brasil of failing to disclose knowledge of counterfeit
contraceptives for thirty days (a court cancelled the government’s fine on appeal). Id. In
2002 in Kansas City, BMS and Eli Lilly settled for $72 million with the families of deceased
victims of counterfeit drugs, possibly to avoid the precedent that drug companies could be
held liable for failing to disseminate information about counterfeits. Id. There are, of course,
counterexamples. ―In 2002, Johnson and Johnson issued 200,000 letters to health care
professionals in the US warning them of fake Procrit…within one week of being notified of a
severe counterfeit problem.‖ Id.
32
For more information on proposed mandatory disclosure requirements, see Letter from
Public Citizen to Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, European
Commission (May 25, 2010), available at http://citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=3458
(commenting on DG TAXUD consultation paper ―Review of EU legislation on customs
enforcement of intellectual property rights‖).
33
OFFICE OF THE U.S. INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (Jun. 2010).
34
ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Art. 3.1.4.
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ACTA’s draft text applies extraordinary rules and ex officio law
enforcement measures appropriate to criminal activity to the context of
market competition and civil infringement. Consumers and industry groups
share this concern. The Intellectual Property Owners Association, which
includes major brand-name pharmaceutical companies on its Board of
Directors, wrote USTR expressing concern that:
ACTA goes far beyond addressing the subject matter of
counterfeiting . . . [and] encompasses issues that are most
appropriately handled as civil infringement causes of action in most
jurisdictions around the world, and especially so in the case of the
United States. . . . [T]he language of ACTA should be tailored to
reflect the narrower stated purpose of an anti-counterfeiting
agreement. Thus, IPO urges USTR to review ACTA to ensure that
the scope of the Act is appropriately limited to its stated purpose of
addressing the limited, though important, subset of infringement
known as ―counterfeiting.‖35
The European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS), with
membership including major firms such as IBM and Sun Microsystems,
agrees, and it ―urges the European Commission to ensure that ACTA only
applies to acts of counterfeiting and piracy, and that it does not apply to all
intellectual property rights.‖36
Law enforcement can appropriately target willful counterfeiting by
spotting fakes and following leads to track criminal operations. But other
intellectual property infringements—civil infringements, including among
others patent and ―similar,‖ non-counterfeit trademark infringement—are not
criminal acts and do not generally represent a fraud on the public. Civil
infringements are generally commercial disputes between legitimate entities,
for which traditional legal remedies are and should be available. The parties
are generally known and can be served with legal process. Because civil
infringements are not fakes, and the parties generally do not operate in a cloak
of secrecy in the manner of criminal organizations, they do not require
preemptive law enforcement interdiction (be it ex officio or on a rights holder
application) wherever they appear in the channels of commerce.
A. Border Enforcement Measures

35

Intellectual Property Owners Association letter to USTR, supra note 5.
―ECIS' concerns on the impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),‖
supra note 5.
36
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The inclusion of civil infringements (geographical indications as well) in
ACTA’s draft border measures section places customs authorities in the role
of arbiters in commercial disputes. Rights holders could use this customs
authority to launch harassing actions against legitimate competitors. Customs
authorities are less prepared than courts to separate well founded from
spurious rights holder claims. ACTA’s limited and discretionary provisions
providing for payment of a security,37 while important, may prove inadequate
if, as seems likely, many allegations of infringement are never fully resolved.
Moreover, customs agents operating under directives and incentives to stop as
much infringing activity as possible will be likely to err on the side of over
enforcement. This will come with costs to legitimate companies including
unwanted legal expenses and uncertainty. This includes intellectual property
owners, which, in the course of doing business, find themselves on each side
of infringement disputes.
Customs and law enforcement should be considered competent to act on
their own authority against criminal, willful commercial scale trademark
counterfeiting and willful commercial scale copyright piracy. And of course,
judicial orders or equivalent legal process can properly empower customs and
law enforcement to take action against a particular civil infringement. But
customs and law enforcement are not competent to arbitrate civil intellectual
property infringements on their own authority, or upon the mere application
of a rights holder. 38
B. Goods in Transit Provisions
These factors apply equally to goods entering or exiting customs territory
and goods in transit. But if ACTA continues to cover civil infringements,
then any provisions applicable to goods in transit should still be limited
specifically to criminal, willful counterfeiting and piracy. Commercial rights
held in one state should not impede the free movement of legitimate goods
that are not destined for that market. In accordance with the foundational
principle of territoriality, intellectual property rights are state-specific (or, in
some European Community cases, regional) in scope and application.39

37

ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 1, Art. 2.9.
Id. at Art. 2.10 states ―Each Party shall adopt or maintain a procedure by which their
competent authorities may determine, within a reasonable period of time … whether the
suspected infringing goods infringe an intellectual property right.‖ But law enforcement
agencies are not competent to assess patent infringement or civil trademark claims. And if
defendants contest the claim of infringement, resolution of the case would seem to require
either adversarial hearings (and perhaps litigation), leading to a longer than reasonable period
—or shortchanging legal process.
39
For a discussion of territoriality, GATT Article V, TRIPS and implications for border
38
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Rights held may be different in the exporting country, transit countries, and
the destination country. Stopping legitimate in transit goods may create a de
facto international intellectual property regime, beyond the appropriate
territorial scope of state authority, with global costs for competition.
V.

ACTA AS A NARRATIVE AND PRECEDENT

ACTA’s greatest public health costs may come not from the substantive
effects of its particular terms—even though these are potentially serious—but
rather from its narrative positioning and precedent. ACTA is a harbinger. As
an IP enforcement agreement and ongoing Committee comprising major
economies, ACTA would establish rules and broader norms some other
countries would follow. The policy goals first articulated by the initial parties
to ACTA would stand as rationales for its specific terms, and establish a
narrative for enforcement initiatives to come.
ACTA’s narrative suggests that intellectual property enforcement protects
consumers from unsafe products. A better understanding of this relationship
is considerably more narrow and complex. Applied prescriptively, this idea
can be dangerous and misleading, supporting the application of incomplete
and indirect intellectual property frameworks rather than much more effective
and comprehensive regulatory measures against unsafe products.
IP
enforcement training programs operated by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office are running this risk right now by advertising IP as a prime tool against
unsafe products in countries with very limited public resources.
ACTA shifts the historic responsibility of exercising market vigilance to
identify infringement from private rights holders to public law enforcement, at
a corresponding cost to taxpayers. And while ACTA’s scope continues to
narrow, the overarching narrative continues to suggest that the varying classes
of intellectual property can be conflated, and treated with similar remedies to
achieve similar ends. ACTA, under its proposed terms, still treats many or all
classes of infringement, including the inevitable commercial infringement
disputes between major businesses, under the general heading ―counterfeits.‖
This narrative diminishes the context and flexibility that has informed the
development of copyright, patent, and trademark law, among other classes of
IP rules, over many years. If all classes of alleged infringement can be
thought of loosely and preemptively as theft, counterfeiting and piracy, a
separate narrative supporting public interests through contextually appropriate
remedies quickly fades. This is part of the importance of maintaining clear
distinctions between willful counterfeiting and civil trademark claims. It is a

measures applied to in transit goods, see XAVIER SEUBA, supra note 8, at16.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

19

PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-09

dividing line between competition and conceptions of criminality. Allowing
that line to slide sets a harmful legal precedent for enforcement measures and
remedies, and supports a rigid view of intellectual property hostile to the
flexibilities that support access to medicines and other public interests.
The interests of public health suggest ACTA’s scope must be narrowed
and tailored. Otherwise, the agreement should be abandoned.40 More
broadly, advocates and policy analysts should contest ACTA’s broadest
narrative, and articulate alternative visions that support the public interests in
safety, competition, innovation, and access over the long term.

40

For a consensus document reflecting the concerns of over ninety academics,
practitioners and public interest organizations from six continents, see INTERNATIONAL
EXPERTS FIND THAT PENDING ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT THREATENS
PUBLIC INTERESTS (Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, Washington
College of Law, ed. June 23, 2010) available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/actacommunique.
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